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Abstract. In studies of social dynamics, cohesion refers to a group’s tendency
to stay in unity, which – as argued in sociometry – arises from the network topol-
ogy of interpersonal ties between members of the group. We follow this idea and
propose a game-based model of cohesion that not only relies on the social net-
work, but also reflects individuals’ social needs. In particular, our model is a type
of cooperative games where players may gain popularity by strategically form-
ing groups. A group is socially cohesive if the grand coalition is core stable. We
study social cohesion in some special types of graphs and draw a link between
social cohesion and the classical notion of structural cohesion [34]. We then focus
on the problem of deciding whether a given social network is socially cohesive
and show that this problem is CoNP-complete. Nevertheless, we give two effi-
cient heuristics for coalition structures where players enjoy high popularity and
experimentally evaluate their performances.
1 Introduction
Human has a natural desire to bind with others and needs to belong to groups. By un-
derstanding the basic instruments that generate coherent social groups, one can explain
important phenomena such as the emergence of norms, group conformity, self-identity
and social classes [12,1,19,18]. For example, studies reveal that on arrival to Western
countries, immigrants tend to form cohesive groups among relatives and acquaintances
in their ethnic communities, which may hamper their acculturation into the new society
[28]. Another study identifies cohesive groups of inhabitants in an Austrian village that
correspond to stratified classes defined by succession to farmland ownership [4].
A social group arises when members of the groups are linked and develop bonds.
Cohesion refers to a tendency for a group to stay in unity, which is considered from
two traditional – and seemingly opposing – views: Firstly, group cohesion refers to a
“pulling force” that draws members together [12]; Secondly, cohesion can also refer to a
type of “resistance” of the group to disruption [17]. A common ground from both views
is that cohesion amounts to a complex process characterised by both the micro-focus
of psychology (fulfilment of personal objectives and needs), and the macro-focus of
sociology (emergence of social classes) [5]. A challenge is therefore to build a general
but rigorous model to bridge the micro- and the macro-foci.
Most theories of group dynamics rely on two fundamental drives: tasks, and social
needs. Indeed, every group exists to accomplish a certain task; cooperation is desir-
able because combining skills and resources leads to a better collective outcome. Based
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solely on this drive, cohesion becomes an issue of economics: how collective gains can
be distributed among members to satisfy each member’s goals. The theory of cooper-
ative games tries to answer this question by assuming people as rational players who
arrive at a stable outcome, i.e., a coalition formation where every coalition finds a stable
division of the collective goods [3]. Social need is another important factor of group dy-
namics. A society embodies complex social relations such as friendship and trust. The
theory of self categorization asserts that individuals mentally associate themselves into
groups based on such traits [18]. Taking social relations into account, White and Harary
describe cohesion as a network property and define structural cohesion [34]; through
this notion they prove that the two seemingly opposing views of cohesion (pulling force
versus resistance to disruption) are in fact equivalent. Their work is then followed by
intensive effort on community detection in the last 10-15 years [10,13].
We identify insufficiencies in the existing mathematical models for social cohesion:
1) Cooperative game is a general framework on the economic process of resource al-
location. While cohesion may imply stability, cooperative games often do not capture
cohesion, as they miss the crucial social network dimension. 2) Structural cohesion of
a network refers to the minimum number of nodes whose removal results in network
disintegration [34]; this is a property of the network on the whole, and does not em-
body individual needs. Hence it fails to link the macro- with the micro-focus of group
dynamics.
In this paper, we define cooperative games on social networks whose nodes are ra-
tional players. Outcomes of the game not only rely on the network of social relations,
but also reflect individuals’ social needs. Our model is consistent with the following
theories: Firstly, we follow the network approach to study social phenomena, which is
started by early pioneers such as Simmel and Dirkheim [11,35]. Secondly, our game-
theoretic formulation is in line with theories in group dynamics that focus on the inter-
dependence of group members [23]. Thirdly, we rigorously verify that networks with
high structural cohesion also tend to be socially cohesive according to our definition.
To define payoffs, we adopt the following intuition: People prefer to be in a group
where they are seen as valuable and influential members. Thus, the payoff of players in
a sub-network should reflect in some sense social positions. Social position is a multi-
dimensional concept affected by a range of factors from behavioural and cognitive traits
to structural and positional properties. Here we focus on the positional properties and
follow the sociometric view that popularity – an important indicator of social position –
arises from interpersonal ties such as liking or attraction among people [20]; a person is
popular if she is liked by a large portion of other people. In particular, the authors of [9]
adopt the degrees of nodes, i.e., the numbers of edges attached to nodes, as a measure
of popularity and identify economical benefits for a person to become popular. Hence
in our games, we define the payoffs of players based on their degrees.
We now summarise the main contributions of the paper: (1) We propose popularity
games on a social network and present a game-based notion of social cohesion, which
refers to the situation when the grand coalition is core stable, a well-known stability
concept. (2) To justify our model, we show consistency between popularity games
and intuition over several special classes of networks. We also build a natural connec-
tion between structural cohesion and our notion of social cohesion (Theorem 19). (3)
We prove that deciding whether a network is socially cohesive is computationally hard
(Theorem 27) (4) Finally, we present two heuristics that decide social cohesion and
compute group structures with high player payoffs and evaluate them by experiments.
Related works. The series of works [27,26,30,32,31] investigates game-based network
centrality. Their aim is to capture a player’s centrality using various instances of semi-
values, which are based on the player’s expected payoff. In contrast, our study aims
at games where the payoff of players are given a priori by degree centrality and focus
on core stability. [7] uses non-cooperative games to explain community formation in a
social network. Each player in their game decides among a fixed set of strategies (i.e. a
given set coalitions); the payoff is defined based on gain and loss which depend on the
local graph structures. [25] studies community formation through cooperative games.
The payoffs of players are given by modularity and modularity-maximising partitions
correspond to Nash equilibria. The focus is on community detection but not on social
cohesion. Furthermore, our payoff function is not additively separable and hence does
not extends from their model. Lastly, our work is different from community detection
[13]. The notion of community structure originates from physics which focuses on a
macro view of the network, while our work is motivated from group dynamics and
focus on individual needs and preferences.
Paper organisation. Section 2 presents the game model and discusses notions of
popularity and social cohesion. Section 3 looks at several standard graph classes and
characterizes core stability in each class. Section 4 links structural cohesion with our
game-based social cohesion. Section 5 proves that deciding social cohesion of a given
network is CoNP-complete. Section 6 relaxes social cohesion to a notion of social ra-
tionality and through experiments, this section connects this notion with community
structures. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses future work.
2 Popularity Games and Social Cohesion
Network and games. A social network is an unweighted graph G = (V,E) where V
is a set of nodes and E is a set of (undirected) edges. An edge {u, v} ⊆ V (where u 6=
v), denoted by uv, represents certain social relation between u, v, such as attraction,
interdependence and friendship. We do not allow loops of the form uu. If uv ∈ E, we
say that u, v are adjacent. A path from a node u to a node v is a finite sequence of nodes
u = u1u2 . . . un = v where uiui+1 ∈ E for all 1 ≤ i < n. The network is connected
if a path exists between any pairs of nodes. Let G = (V,E) be a social network. We
define a cooperative game on G where each node in V is a rational player. The reader
is referred to [29] for more details on cooperative game theory.
Definition 1. A cooperative game (with non-transferrable utility) is a pair G = (V, ρ)
where V is a set of players, and ρ : V × 2V → R is a payoff function.
A coalition formation ofG is a partition of V W = {V1, . . . , Vk}, i.e.,
⋃
1≤i≤k Vi = V ,
∀1≤i<j≤k : Vi ∩Vj = ∅; each set Vi is called a coalition. The grand coalition forma-
tion isWG = {V } where V is called the grand coalition. Cooperative games describe
situations where players strategically build coalitions based on individual payoffs. A
predicted outcome of the game is a stable coalition formation in the sense that no set of
players have the incentive to “disrupt” the formation by binding into a new coalition.
More precisely, let (V, ρ) be a cooperative game. Take a coalition formationW and set
ρW(u) := ρ(u, S) where u ∈ S and S ∈ W .
Definition 2. A non-empty set of playersH ⊆ V is blocking forW if ∀u ∈ H : ρ(u,H) >
ρW(u); In this case we say thatW is blocked by H .
In other words, if S blocksW , then every u ∈ S will get a higher payoff if they join S.
Definition 3. A coalition formationW ofG is core stable w.r.t. (V, ρ) if it is not blocked
by any set H ⊆ V .
Popularity. Social positions, as argued in sociometric studies, arise from the network
topology [8]. A long line of research studies how different centralities (e.g. degree,
closeness, betweenness, etc.) give rise to “positional advantage” of individuals. In par-
ticular, degree centrality refers to the number of edges attached to a node. Despite its
conceptual simplicity, degree centrality naturally represents (sociometric) popularity,
which plays a crucial role in a person’s self-efficacy and social needs [37,9]. Popularity
depends on the underlying group: a person may be very popular in one group while be-
ing unknown to another. Hence individuals may gain popularity by forming groups
strategically. We thus make our next definition. The sub-network induced on a set
S ⊆ V is GS = (S,ES) where ES = E ∩ S2. degS(u) denotes |{v : uv ∈ ES}|
and we write deg(u) for degV (u).
Definition 4. The popularity of a node u in a subset S ⊆ V is pS(u) := degS(u)/|S|.
Note that p{u}(u) = 0 for every node u. If u ∈ S has an edge to all other nodes in
the graph GS, then u is the most popular node in S with pS(u) = (|S| − 1)/|S|. The
popularity of any player is in the range [0, 1).
Definition 5. The popularity game on G = (V,E) is a cooperative game Γ (G) =
(V, ρ) where ρ : V × 2V → [0, 1) is defined by ρ(u, S) = pS(u).
An outcome of the popularity game Γ (G) assigns any player u with a coalition S 3
u. The sum of popularity of members of S equals their average degree in S, i.e.∑
u∈S pS(u) =
∑
u∈S degS(u)/|S| = 2|ES|/|S|. The average degree measures the
density of the set S, which reflects the amount of interactions within S, and thus can
be regarded as a collective utility. In this sense, the popularity game is efficient in dis-
tributing such collective utility among players according to their popularity.
Social cohesion. Social cohesion represents a group’s tendency to remain united in
satisfying members’ social needs [6]. We express cohesion through core stability w.r.t.
the popularity game Γ (G): Suppose a coalition formation W is not core stable. Then
there is a set S ⊆ V every member of which would gain a higher popularity in S than in
their own coalitions inW . Thus there is a latent incentive among members of S to dis-
ruptW and form a new coalition S. On the contrary, a core stableW represents a state
of the network that is resilience to such “disruptions”. Thus, when the grand coalition
formationWG = {V } is core stable, all members bind naturally and harmoniously into
a single group and would remain so as long as the network topology does not change.
Definition 6. A network G = (V,E) is socially cohesive (or simply cohesive) if the
grand coalition formationWG is core stable w.r.t. the popularity game Γ (G).
Example 1. Fig. 1(a) displays a network G1 = (V1, E1). The popularity pV (i) is 1/3 if
i = b, f , and the popularity is 1/2 if i = a, c, d, e. The set {a, b, c} blocksWG1 as each
member has popularity 2/3. The only core stable formation is {{a, b, c}, {d, e, f}}.
Adding the edge ad (shown in red) would make G1 socially cohesive as the popularity
of both a, d in V1 reaches 2/3. Fig. 1(b) displays another network G2 = (V2, E2)
where pV (a) = 4/5 and pV (i) = 1/5 for all i = b, . . . , e. Note that this graph is
socially cohesive as the grand coalition structureWG2 is not blocked. However, adding
the edge bc (shown in red) will destroy social cohesion as then {b, c} blocks WG2 .
Social psychological studies often presume that more ties leads to higher cohesion; this
example displays a more complicated picture: Adding an edge may establish cohesion,
but may also sabotage cohesion.
Fig. 1. The graphs considered in Example 1 are in black. The added edges are highlighted in red.
Theorem 7 (Connectivity). If a coalition formation W of G is core stable then any
S ∈ W either consists of a set of isolated nodes, or induces a connected subgraph.
Proof. Suppose that S is not a set of isolated nodes, and that S = V1∪V2 where V1, V2
are non-empty and no edge exists between any pair in V1×V2. Take a node u ∈ S with
non-zero degree, and say, without loss of generality, that u ∈ V1. Then
pV1(u) =
degV1(u)
|V1| >
degV1(u)
|S| =
degS(u)
|S| = pS(u).
HenceW does not contain S. uunionsq
Theorem 7 states that any two nodes (that are not isolated nodes themselves) not con-
nected by a path have no incentive to be in the same coalition. Hence it is sufficient to
only consider coalitions that induce connected sub-networks of a social network.
Definition 8. A set S ⊆ V is called a social group of G if S induces a connected
sub-network. A group structure is a coalition formation containing only social groups.
The next theorem shows that social cohesion is inherently a small group property, i.e.,
socially cohesive networks have bounded size.
Theorem 9. Let δ(G) be the maximum degree of nodes in G = (V,E). Then G is
socially cohesive only when |V | ≤ 2δ(G) unless |V | = 1.
Proof. Suppose |V | > 2δ(G) and |V | > 1. If E = ∅, G is not socially cohesive by
Theorem 7. Otherwise, pick an edge uv. Then max{deg(u),deg(v)} ≤ δ(G) < |V |/2.
This means that max{pV (u), pV (v)} < 1/2, and the edge {u, v} forms a blocking set.
Thus G is not socially cohesive. uunionsq
3 Social Cohesion in Special Classes of Graphs
We now investigate our games on some standard classes of graphs and characterize core
stable group structures.
Complete networks. A graph G = (V,E) is complete if an edge exists between any
pair of nodes. It corresponds to the tightest social structure where all members mutually
interact. Naturally, one would expect a complete network to be socially cohesive.
Theorem 10. Let G = (V,E) be a complete network. The grand coalition is the only
core stable group structure. Hence G is socially cohesive.
Proof. Any induced sub-network GS of a complete network G = (V,E) (where S ⊆
V ) is also complete. Thus
pS(u) =
|S| − 1
|S| <
|V | − 1
|V | = pV (u).
Therefore any player’s popularity is maximised in the grand coalition V . uunionsq
Star networks. A star network contains a node c (centre), a number of other nodes
u1, . . . , um (tails) where m > 1, and edges {cu1, . . . , cum}. Intuitively, the centre c
would like to be in a social group with as many players as possible, while a tail would
like to be with as few others as possible.
Theorem 11. A group structure W of a star network is core stable if and only if the
centre is in the same social group with at least half of the tails. Thus, any star network
is socially cohesive.
Proof. Take any group structureW and suppose the centre c is in a social group S with
` tails. Then pS(c) = `/(`+1) and for any tail ui ∈ S, pS(ui) = 1/(`+1). All players
not in S has popularity 0 as their social groups contain only one node.
– Suppose ` ≥ m/2. Take any set S′ 6= S that contains c. If |S′| ≤ |S|, then pS′(c) ≤
pS(c). If |S′| > |S|, then pS′(v) < pS(v) for some tail v. In either case S′ does not
blockW . HenceW is core stable.
– Suppose ` < m/2. Then let N be the set of all tails not in S. Then |N | > `. Hence
the set {c} ∪N is a blocking set forW as p{c}∪N (c) > pS(c).
ThusW is core stable if and only if ` ≥ m/2. uunionsq
Complete Bipartite Graph. A complete bipartite graph Kn,n consists of disjoint sets
of nodes V1, V2 with n nodes each and E = {uv | u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2} (where m,n 6= 0).
Let W be a group structure. For every S ∈ W , we use `(S) and r(S) to denote |{v |
v ∈ S ∩ V1}| and |{v | v ∈ S ∩ V2}|, respectively.
Lemma 12. W is core stable only if ∀S ∈ W : `(S) ≥ r(S).
Proof. Suppose there is S ∈ W with `(S) < r(S). Since m ≥ n, there is H ∈ W with
`(H) > r(H). Take any u ∈ S ∩ V2 and v ∈ H ∩ V1. Then we have
pS(u) =
r(S)
`(S) + r(S)
<
1
2
, and
pH(v) =
`(H)
`(H) + r(H)
<
1
2
.
Hence, the set {u, v} blocksW as p{u,v}(u) = p{u,v}(v) = 1/2. uunionsq
We next characterize core stable group structure in Kn,n. In particular, perfect match-
ings, i.e., situations when every v ∈ V1 is matched with a unique player in V2, are core
stable.
Theorem 13. A group structureW ofKn,n is core stable if and only if ∀S ∈ W : `(S) =
r(S).
Proof. By Lemma 12, if W is core stable then ∀S ∈ W : `(S) = r(S). Conversely,
if ∀S ∈ W : `(S) = r(S), then any v has payoff 1/2. ThusW is core stable as every
H ⊆ V contains some player with payoff at most 1/2. uunionsq
We now turn our attention to Km,n with arbitrary m ≥ n ≥ 1 and focus on a
special type of group structures: A clan structureW is a group structure that contains
at most one non-singleton social group, called the clan; all other social groups contain
only single players, called the exiles. The number ι(W) is the number of exiles, i.e.,
ι(W) = |{S ∈ W | |S| = 1}|. It is clear that any group structure of a star network
is a clan structure. Theorem 11 then becomes a special case (when n = 1) of the next
theorem, which characterizes core stable clans structures of Km,n.
Theorem 14. For any m ≥ n > 0, a clan structure W of Km,n is core stable if and
only if the clan S contains all nodes in V2 and `(S) ≥ max{n, ι(W)·n}. Thus, Km,n
is socially cohesive.
Proof. SupposeW is a core stable clan structure. Lemma 12 implies that the clan S con-
tains all nodes in V2 and `(S)≥n. If `(S)<ι(W)·n, (ι(W)+1)`(S)<ι(W)(`(S)+n)
and thus `(S)`(S)+n <
ι(W)
ι(W)+1 . Then the set {v} ∪X blocksW where v ∈ S ∩ V2 and X
is the set of exiles in G. Hence we must have `(S) ≥ max{n, ι(W) · n}.
Conversely, suppose V2 ⊆ S and `(S) ≥ max{n, ι(W)n}. Assume for a contradic-
tion that H blocksW . Then for any v ∈ H ∩ V2, pH(v) > pS(v) = `(S)`(S)+n ≥ ι(W)ι(W)+1 .
This means that H must contain a player u ∈ V1 that belongs to S, and we must have
pH(u) > pS(u) =
n
`(S)+n . However,
1 =
n
`(S) + n
+
`(S)
`(S) + n
= pS(u) + pS(v)
< pH(u) + pH(v)
=
`(H)
`(H) + r(H)
+
r(H)
`(H) + r(H)
= 1
Contradiction. ThusW is core stable. uunionsq
4 Structural Cohesion and Social Cohesion
White and Harary in [34] describe group cohesion using graph connectivity.
Definition 15 (White and Harary [34]). Let G be a connected graph. The structural
cohesion κ of a connected graph G is the minimal number of nodes upon removal of
which G become disconnected.
As stated in [34], a larger κ implies that G is more resilient to conflicts or the departure
of group members, and is thus more cohesive. Moreover, Menger’s theorem states that κ
is the greatest lower bound on the number of paths between any pairs of nodes. Hence κ
is a reasonable measure of cohesion. We next link κ with our notion of social cohesion.
In [16], a pair uv /∈ E is seen as a type of “structural hole” that forbids communication
and is thus referred to as an absent tie. For each S ⊆ V and u ∈ S we define the
following:
1. fin(u, S) := degS(u) is the number of actual ties of u within the group S,
2. fout(u, S) := |{v /∈ S | uv ∈ E}| is the number of actual ties of u outside S,
3. sin(u, S) := |S| − fin(u, S) is the number of absent ties (including u itself) in S,
and
4. sout(u, S) := |{v /∈ S | uv /∈ E}| is the number of absent ties outside S.
These variables give rise to a characterization of social cohesion. Intuitively, if S ⊆ V
is a blocking set, each member u tends to have many actual ties within S and absent
ties outside S, i.e., high fin(u, S) and sout(u, S), and u tends to have few absent ties in
S and actual ties outside S, i.e., low fout(u, S) and sin(u, S). Thus, we define for all
S ⊆ V , u ∈ S,
γ(u, S) := fin(u, S)sout(u, S)− fout(u, S)sin(u, S) (1)
Lemma 16. For all S ⊆ V , S blocksWG = {V } if and only if ∀u ∈ S : γ(u, S) > 0.
Proof. For each u ∈ S, pS(u) = fin(u,S)fin(u,S)+sin(u,S) and
pV (u) =
deg(u)
|V | =
fin(u, S) + fout(u, S)
fin(u, S) + fout(u, S) + sin(u, S) + sout(u, S)
The set S blocksWG if and only if ∀u ∈ S : pS(u) > pV (u), which can be shown to
be equivalent to fin(u, S) ·sout(u, S) > fout(u, S) ·sin(u, S) using the above equalities.
uunionsq
A network G contains a minimal cut A0 ⊆ V of size κ, i.e., removing A0 from G
decomposes the graph into m distinct connected components A1, . . . , Am ⊆ V where
m ≥ 2, i.e., G contains disjoint sets A1, . . . , Am ⊆ V such that each GAi is con-
nected, and for any j 6= i all paths between GAi and GAj go through A0. We further
assume that |A1| ≤ · · · ≤ |Am| and A0 is chosen in a way where |A1| is as small
as possible. Let χ be the size |A1|, and let µ be the largest possible length m of the
sequence of Ai’s. We first look at the case when κ = 1.
Lemma 17. If κ = 1 and G is socially cohesive, then χ < 2.
Proof. Suppose κ = 1 and χ ≥ 2. Let (A1, . . . , Am) be an optimal cut sequence. Take
u ∈ A1. As G contains a cut node, fout(u,A1) ≤ 1 and sout(u,A1) ≥ |V | − |A1| −
1 = |V | − χ − 1. Then γ(u,A1) ≥ fin(u,A1) · (|V | − χ − 1) − sin(u,A1). Since
fin(u,A1) + sin(u,A1) = χ,
γ(u,A1) ≥ fin(u,A1)(|V | − χ− 1)− (χ− fin(u,A1))
= fin(u,A1)(|V | − χ)− χ.
Since |V |−χ>χ, γ(u,A1)>0. Thus by Lemma 16,A1 blocks the grand coalitionWG.
uunionsq
We now generalize Lemma 17 to graphs with higher structural cohesion.
Lemma 18. Suppose µ > 2. Then any network G is socially cohesive only if χ < κµ−2 .
Proof. Suppose µ > 2. Take an optimal cut sequence (A1, ..., Aµ) and u ∈ V1. Since
deg(u) < χ+κ and |V | ≥ µχ+κ, we have pV (u) < χ+κµ·χ+κ . Suppose χ ≥ κµ−2 . Then
µχ− 2χ ≥ κ. One can then derive that pV (u) < χ+κµ·χ+κ ≤ 12 . Thus any edge {u, v} in
GV1 forms a blocking set of the grand coalition formationWG. uunionsq
Lemma 18 can be used as a (semi-)test for social cohesion when µ > 2: whenever χ
exceeds κµ−2 ,G is not socially cohesive. Clearly, more graphs become socially cohesive
as κ gets larger. Summarizing Lemma 17 and Lemma 18, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 19. Let G be a network.
– If κ = 1, then G is not socially cohesive as long as χ ≥ 2.
– If κ > 1 and µ > 2, then G is not socially cohesive as long as χ ≥ κµ−2
Remark 20. The only case left unexplained is when κ > 1 and µ = 2. In this case there
exist graphs with arbitrarily large χ but are socially cohesive.
5 The Computational Complexity of Deciding Social Cohesion
We focus on the computational problem of deciding if a network is socially cohesive.
More precisely, We are interested in the decision problem COH:
INPUT A network G = (V,E)
OUTPUT Decide if G is socially cohesive.
Instead of considering networks in general, we restrict our attention to a special type of
networks. The distance between two nodes u and v, denoted by dist(u, v), is the length
of a shortest path from u to v inG. The eccentricity of u is ecc(u) = maxv∈V dist(u, v).
The diameter of the network G is diam(G) = maxu∈V ecc(u).
Definition 21. A graph G = (V,E) is diametrically uniform if all v ∈ V have the
same eccentricity; otherwise G is called non-diametrically uniform.
We use NDU2 to denote the set of all non-diametrically uniform connected graphs
whose diameter is at most 2. Our goal is to show that the COH problem is compu-
tationally hard already on the class NDU2. The following is a characterization theorem
for NDU2 graphs.
Theorem 22. The network G belongs to NDU2 if and only if its nodes V can be parti-
tioned into two non-empty set V1 and V2, where V1 = {u | vu ∈ E for all v 6= u}.
Proof. Since G has diameter 2 and is not diametrically uniform, there is a non-empty
set V1 of nodes with eccentricity 1, and the other nodes (call them V2) have eccentricity
2. The sets V1, V2 satisfy the condition in the theorem. uunionsq
LetG be a graph inNDU2. We call {V1, V2} as described in Theorem 22 the eccentricity
partition of G. We first present some simple properties of NDU2.
Lemma 23. The network G in NDU2 is socially cohesive if and only if no set S ⊆ V2
blocksWG.
Proof. One direction (left to right) is clear. Conversely, suppose the network is not
socially cohesive. Let S ⊂ V be a blocking set of the grand coalition formation, i.e.,
∀u∈S : pS(u) > pV (u). If S∩V1 6= ∅. Then ∀u ∈ S∩V1 : pV (u) = |V |−1|V | . However,
pV (u) ≥ |S|−1|S| ≥ pS(u) which contradicts that fact that S is a blocking set. uunionsq
By the lemma above, the structure ofGV2 is crucial in determining social cohesion
of G. For any S ⊆ V2 and u ∈ S, we recall the notions fin(u, S), fout(u, S), sin(u, S),
and sout(u, S) from Section 4, but re-interpret these values within the sub-network
GV2. Hence, we now set fout(u, S) as |{v ∈ V2 \ S | uv ∈ E}|, i.e., the number
of ties that u has within V2 but not in S, the other variables remain as originally de-
fined. Thus
|V2| = fin(u, S) + fout(u, S) + sin(u, S) + sout(u, S) (2)
We then define the value
λ(u, S) =
fin(u, S) · sout(u, S)
sin(u, S)
− fout(u, S)
Theorem 24. A network G in NDU2 is socially cohesive if and only if for all S ⊆ V2
there exists v ∈ S such that |V1| ≥ λ(v, S)
Proof. By Lemma 23, we only need to examine subsets S ⊆ V2. Every u ∈ S has
pS(u) =
fin(u, S)
fin(u, S) + sin(u, S)
and pV (u) =
fin(u, S) + fout(u, S) + |V1|
|V2|+ |V1| .
A set S ⊆ V2 blocksWG = {V } if and only if ∀u ∈ S : pS(u) > pV (u). Note that
fin(u, S)
fin(u, S) + sin(u, S)
>
fin(u, S) + fout(u, S) + |V1|
|V2|+ |V1| if and only if
fin(u, S)(|V1|+|V2|) > (fin(u, S)+sin(u, S))(fin(u, S)+fout(u, S)+|V1|).
Applying (2), S blocksWG if and only if ∀u ∈ S : pS(u) > pV (u), if and only if
∀u ∈ S : |V1| < fin(u,S)sout(u,S)sin(u,S) − fout(u, S) = λ(u, S), as required. uunionsq
We now give a sufficient condition for social cohesion of an NDU2 network. The
size of a network is its number of nodes. A clique is a complete subgraph. The clique
number of G, denoted by ω(G), is the size of the largest clique. Tura´n’s theorem relates
ω(G) with the number of edges in G:
Theorem 25 (Tura´n [33]). For any p ≥ 2, if a graph G with n nodes has more than
p−2
2(p−1)n
2 edges, then ω(G) ≥ p.
Lemma 26. For any social group S ⊆ V , there exists u ∈ S with fin(u,S)sin(u,S)≤ω(GS)−1.
Proof. Let k = ω(GS) and suppose for all u ∈ S, fin(u,S)sin(u,S) > k − 1. Since |S| =
fin(u, S) + sin(u, S),
k − 1 < fin(u, S)/(|S| − fin(u, S))
fin(u, S)
|S| − fin(u, S) > k − 1
fin(v, S) > (c− 1)(|S| − fin(v, S))
fin(u, S) > k|S| − kfin(u, S)− |S|+ fin(u, S)
kfin(u, S) > |S| · (k − 1)
fin(u, S) > (k − 1)|S|/k
Thus ES contains > k−12k |S|2 edges. By Theorem 25, GS contains a size-(k + 1)
clique, contradicting k’s definition. uunionsq
The following is a sufficient condition for social cohesion of an NDU2 network G.
Intuitively, the set V1 contains the most socially active members – those who interact
with everyone else. Hence they serve as “socializers” who hold the group together. The
larger V1 gets, the more likely G will be socially cohesive. There is a bound such that
once |V1| exceeds it, the network G is guaranteed to be socially cohesive.
Lemma 27. Suppose c = ω(GV2) and |V2| > c(c − 1). Then G is socially cohesive
whenever |V1| ≥ (c− 1)(|V2| − c).
Proof. Suppose |V2| > c(c − 1), |V1| ≥ (c − 1)(|V2| − c). Take any S ⊆ V2. If S
has a size-c clique, by Lemma 26 there exists u ∈ V2 with fin(u,S)sin(u,S) ≤ c − 1. Since
sout(u, S) ≤ |V2| − c, we have
|V1| ≥ (c− 1)(|V2| − c) ≥ fin(u, S)
sin(u, S)
sout(u, S) > λ(u, S)
and thus G is socially cohesive by Theorem 24.
If S contains no clique of size c, then ω(GS)≤c−1. Let k = ω(GS). By Lemma 26,
fin(u,S)
sin(u,S)
≤k−1<c−1. Thus c− |V2|sin(v,S)≥1. Since sout(u, S)=|V2|−fin(u, V2)−sin(u, S),
λ(u, S) =
fin(u, S)
sin(u, S)
(|V2| − fin(u, V2)− sin(u, S))− fout(u, S)
=
fin(u, S)
sin(u, S)
(|V2| − fin(u, V2))− fin(u, S)− fout(u, S)
=
fin(u, S)
sin(u, S)
(|V2| − fin(u, V2))− fin(u, V2).
Furthermore, since fin(u, S) = |S| − sin(u, S),
λ(u, S) =
(|S| − sin(u, S))(|V2| − fin(u, V2))
sin(u, S)
− fin(u, V2)
=
|S| · |V2| − |S|fin(u, V2)− |V2|sin(u, S)
sin(u, S)
=
|S| · |V2|
sin(u, S)
− |S|fin(u, V2)
sin(u, S)
− |V2|.
Hence, |V1| − λ(u, S) is at least
(c− 1)(|V2| − c)−
( |S| · |V2|
sin(u, S)
− |S|fin(u, V2)
sin(u, S)
− |V2|
)
= |V2|
(
c− |S|
sin(u, S)
)
− c(c− 1) + |S|fin(u, V2)
sin(u, S)
≥ 0
The last step is by c− |S|sin(v,S)≥1 and |V2|>c(c−1). By Theorem 24, G is socially cohe-
sive. uunionsq
Theorem 28. The problemCOH isCoNP-complete. FurthermoreCoNP-hardness holds
already for the class NDU2.
Proof. The complement of COH, COH, asks whether a set S blocks the grand coalition
WG of a given network G; this problem is clearly in NP and thus COH is in CoNP.
Algorithm 1 Construction of H given G = (V,E) and k > 2
1: Set d := k ·max{deg(u) | u ∈ V }
2: Create G′ by adding k(k−1)+d isolated nodes (and no new edges) to G
3: Let V2 be the set of nodes in G′ (which contains all nodes in V and new nodes)
4: Create a complete graph with (k−1)(|V2|−k)−d nodes; Let V1 be the set of these nodes
5: Create edges {uv | u ∈ V1, v ∈ V2} to connect V1, V2. The resulting graph is H .
For hardness, we reduce MaxClique (asking whether a graph contains a clique of a
given size k) to COH. CoNP-hardness of COH then follows from the NP-hardness of
MaxClique [14].
To this end, we construct, for a given G = (V,E) and k > 2, a graph H ∈ NDU2 as
in Alg. 1. Our goal is to show that H is not socially cohesive if and only if G contains
a clique of size k. It is clear that H is a NDU2 network with eccentricity partition
{V1, V2}. Let c = ω(G). Suppose c < k. By definition of V1 and V2, we have
|V1| − (c− 1)(|V2| − c) = |V2|(k − c)− k(k − 1) + c(c− 1)− d.
Since k>c and |V2|>k(k−1)+d, |V1|≥(c−1)(|V2|−c). By Theorem 27,H is cohesive.
Conversely, suppose ω(G) ≥ k. Let C ⊆ V2 be a clique of size k. Take u ∈ C.
Since fin(u,C) = k − 1, sout(u,C) = |V2| − k − fout(u,C) and sin(u,C) = 1,
λ(u,C) = (k − 1)(|V2| − k − fout(u,C))− fout(u,C)
= (k − 1)(|V2| − k)− k · fout(u,C)
Hence, λ(u,C)−|V1| = d− kfout(u,C). Since d ≥ k deg(u), λ(u,C)− |V1| > 0. By
Lemma 24, G is not socially cohesive. Therefore, G contains a clique of size k if and
only if H is not socially cohesive and the reduction is complete. uunionsq
6 Efficient Heuristics
We propose two heuristics that construct group structures of a given network where
players enjoy high popularity. These heuristics (partially) solve COH despite COH’s
inherent complexity: Each heuristic builds a group structure W and checks if any set
S ∈ W blocks WG. If G is socially cohesive, then no such S will be found; On the
other hand, if a blocking set S is found, G is surely not socially cohesive.
Heuristic 1: Louvain’s method (LM) We observe that blocking sets of WG are usually
tightly connected within, but are sparsely connected with nodes outside. This property
corresponds to the well-studied notion of communities [13]. Therefore, the first heuristic
uses a well-known community detection algorithm, Louvain’s method [2], to compute
a group structure in G.
Heuristic 2: Average payoff (AP) The second heuristic aims to optimize the average
payoffs of members of a coalition. Socially cohesive networks usually have small diam-
eters (≤ 2). Thus we consider neighborhood N(v) := {v} ∪ {u | uv ∈ E} of players
v ∈ V . In Alg. 2, let ν(S) be the average payoff∑u∈S ρ(u, S)/|S| in any set S ⊆ V .
Algorithm 2 AP: Given a network G = (V,E)
1: Initialize set V ′ := V and a group structureW := ∅
2: while |V ′| > 0 do
3: compute νw := ν(N(w) ∩ V ′) for every w ∈ V ′
4: S := N(v) ∩ V ′ such that ∀u ∈ V ′ : νu ≤ νv
5: W :=W ∪ {S}  Add S toW
6: V ′ := V ′ \ S
7: end while
8: returnW
Experiments. We evaluate the heuristics on graphs of size n = 5, . . . , 18. For each size,
let s be the total number of graphs, b be the number of graphs for which the heuristic
finds a blocking set, and c be the number of socially cohesive graphs. The heuristic thus
correctly solves COH for b + c graphs. Hence the heuristic has accuracy (b + c)/s.
For n = 5, 6, 7, we exhaustively enumerate all connected graphs; LM has accuracy
96.8%, 97.7% and 83.1%, resp., while AP has 85.9%, 68.5% and 69.2%, resp. For
each n = 8, . . . , 18, we uniformly randomly sample 105 graphs of size n. As shown
in Fig. 2(a), both heuristics achieve high accuracy. As n increases, socially cohesive
graphs become increasingly rare. The results show that the heuristics successfully find
blocking sets in almost all cases, with AP performs slightly better (100% accuracy for
n ≥ 12). We then consider the coalitions constructed by the heuristics. Fig. 2(b) shows
that while LM fails to output core stable group structures, AP achieves core stability in
60% of the sampled cases when n ≥ 7. Nevertheless, Fig. 2(c) shows that, compared
to the payoffs in the grand coalition, more nodes get a higher payoff in the coalitions
identified by LM than in the coalitions identified by AP.
Fig. 2. The results of running heuristics LM and AP on graphs with n = 5, . . . , 18 nodes. (a)
Accuracy (b) The percentage of graphs for which the heuristics find a core stable group structure
(c) The percentage of nodes with an increased payoff in the found group structure than in the
grand coalition.
Real world networks. We further evaluate the heuristics on 8 real-world networks:
karate club ZA [36], dolphins DO [24], college football FT [15], Facebook FB, Enron
email network EN [22], and three physics collaboration networks AS, CM and HE [21].
We only use the largest components in each network; see details in Table. 1. Expect-
edly, none of these networks are socially cohesive. The box-and-whisker diagrams in
Fig. 3 show the distribution of payoffs of players in the grand coalition as well as in the
coalitions output by each heuristic (outliers omitted). In all cases, the heuristics improve
players’ payoffs considerably compared to the grand coalition, while AP in particular
achieves higher payoffs. Furthermore, Fig. 4 shows that all nodes get higher payoffs
through LM. In summary, both of the heuristics are useful in computing coalitions;
while LM may benefit a larger portion of players, AP tends to obtain higher payoffs.
Table 1. Statistics of the real-world networks used in our experiment. The parameters N , E, C
denote the number of nodes, edges, and communities, respectively.
ZA DO FT FB
N 34 62 115 3959
E 78 159 613 84243
C 4 5 10 27
EN AS CM HE
N 36692 18772 23133 12008
E 183831 198110 93497 118521
C 248 36 58 37
7 Conclusion and future work
This paper investigates social cohesion through a type of cooperative games. We show
that social cohesion are closely related to structural cohesion and demonstrate that
checking social cohesion is computationally hard. We aim to investigate natural game-
theoretical and computational questions as future works: Does a core stable group struc-
ture exists for every network? What about other stability concepts? What would be
strategies of players to improve popularity? The proposed games are instances of a more
general framework for network-based cooperative games, where payoffs of players are
given by various centrality indices. It is interesting to extend the work by consider-
ing other centralities, and different forms of social networks (e.g. directed, weighted,
signed). Furthermore, one could also explore the evolution of social groups in a dy-
namic setting.
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